Loose Dogs, Lost Lives, and Local Government Duty: Brooks v. Bienville Parish Police Jury

When the Louisiana Second Circuit speaks on statutory duties, the words echo far beyond the courthouse. In Brooks v. Bienville Parish Police Jury, No. 56,519-CA (La. 2d Cir. 2025), the court grappled with a heartbreaking set of facts: a fatal dog mauling, alleged governmental inaction, and whether local government can shield itself behind statutory immunity.

The panel’s conclusion was striking: the Bienville Parish Police Jury (“BPPJ”) may have more than just discretion — it has a mandatory statutory duty to provide facilities for seized dogs. The ruling reverses a trial court dismissal and signals that Louisiana parishes cannot shrug off their statutory obligations by pointing to gaps or ambiguities in animal-control law.

The Tragedy and the Lawsuit

In October 2023, Donovan Brooks was allegedly killed by a pack of dogs roaming Pine Street in Ringgold, Louisiana. His siblings sued multiple parties: the dog owners, the property owner, local officials, and the BPPJ.

The crux of the claim against the BPPJ was legislative: under Louisiana law, parishes are charged with regulating dogs at large (La. R.S. 3:2731), authorizing seizure of stray or vicious animals (La. R.S. 3:2773), and — most critically — requiring that “each parish shall provide suitable shelters or facilities for dogs seized under the provisions of this Part” (La. R.S. 3:2774).

The plaintiffs argued that the BPPJ’s failure to establish such facilities directly endangered the public by making seizure of vicious dogs impractical or impossible.

The Trial Court: Following Gray

The trial court dismissed the claims on an exception of no cause of action. Relying on reasoning from a companion case (Da’vyta Gray v. Town of Ringgold), the court held that the BPPJ’s decisions were discretionary. Since parishes have the option, not the obligation, to enact animal-control ordinances, the court reasoned, the BPPJ could not be liable.

In other words: no duty, no case.

The Second Circuit: Duty Means Duty

Judge Stephens, writing for the panel, rejected that approach. Conducting a de novo review, the court carefully parsed the statutory framework. It emphasized that La. R.S. 3:2774 imposes a mandatory duty — the statute says each parish “shall provide” shelters. The court was unpersuaded by the BPPJ’s argument that this duty only triggers after an actual seizure of a dog.

Such a reading, the panel reasoned, would yield absurd results: where would seized dogs be kept if the parish had never created a shelter in the first place? Who, practically speaking, would maintain control of dangerous animals during the statutory holding period?

The Second Circuit concluded:

• The duty to provide a shelter is not discretionary.

• The manner in which the duty is discharged (building a facility, contracting with third parties, etc.) remains discretionary.

• Because the duty itself is mandatory, statutory immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 does not apply.

The trial court’s dismissal was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Legal and Policy Significance

This opinion has broader implications for Louisiana local government law and tort liability:

1. Clarifying Statutory Duties: Courts are often hesitant to impose duties on local governments where statutes appear permissive. Here, the Second Circuit drew a bright line: “shall provide” means what it says.

2. Immunity Limits: Louisiana’s statutory immunity provision, La. R.S. 9:2798.1, is powerful, but it cannot shield governmental entities from failing to perform mandatory duties.

3. Public Safety and Local Governance: This ruling highlights the tension between parish discretion and public expectation. In communities without active animal control programs, tragedies like Donovan Brooks’s death expose the costs of governmental inaction.

Closing Thoughts

Brooks is more than a wrongful-death suit; it is a referendum on how seriously Louisiana parishes must take statutory responsibilities in protecting citizens from known dangers. While the plaintiffs still face hurdles on the merits — proving causation, damages, and breach — they cleared the critical threshold: their case can go forward.

The decision also underscores a lesson for municipal lawyers: when the legislature uses “shall,” courts will hold you to it.